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ADVOCACY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT*
Robert H. Jackson**
The invitation to deliver this lecture is a signal honor, and
the temptation is to respond with a discourse upon some
tempestuous issue of world-wide reverberations. But it will
encounter less competition and be more useful to the profession
to choose a workaday subject on which I have some experience
to support my opinions and you have personal experience to
warrant criticising them. Let us consider together the problems
which confront a lawyer when his case reaches its journey's end
in the Supreme Court of the United States.
More then ten years ago, Mr. John W. Davis, in a wise and
stimulating lecture on "The Argument of an Appeal," shared
with our profession the lessons of his own rich experience. He
suggested, however, that such a lecture should come from a
judge-from one who is to be persuaded, rather than from an
advocate. With characteristic felicity, he said: "Who would
listen to a fisherman's weary discourse on fly-casting ... if the

fish himself could be induced to give his views on the ,most
effective method of approach?"' I cannot add to the available
learning on this subject.2 I can only offer some meditations by
one of the fish.
* © Cornell Law Review. Originally published at 37 Cornell L. Q. I (1951); reprinted by
permission of the Cornell Law Review.
** Address by Hon. Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, delivered upon the Morrison Lecture Foundation before the California State Bar on
August 23, 1951.
1. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895 (1940).
2. In addition to the lecture in note 1, the students of the subject should see Birkett,
The Art of Advocacy, 34 A.B.A.J. 4 (1948); Birkett, Law and Literature-The Equipment
of the Lawyer, 36 A.B.A.J. 891 (1950). Weiner, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY (1950)
is a comprehensive and instructive text on appellate advocacy in general, but with especial
reference to the United States Supreme Court. STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
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Let me confess that, when dangling bait before judges, I
have not always practiced what I now preach. Many lessons that
I pass on to you were learned the hard way in the years when I
was intensively occupied with presentation of government
litigations to the Court. And if I appear to overrate trifles,
remember that a multitude of small perfections help to set
mastery of the art of advocacy apart from its counterfeit-mere
forensic fluency.
IS ORAL ARGUMENT DECISIVE?

Lawyers sometimes question the value of the relatively
short oral argument permitted in the Nation's highest Court.
They ask whether it is not a vestigial formality with little effect
on the result. In earlier times, with few cases on its docket, the
Court could and did hear arguments that lasted for days from
such advocates as Webster, Pinkney, and Luther Martin. Over
the years the time allotted for hearing has been shortened, but its
importance has not diminished. The significance of the trend is
that the shorter the time, the more precious is each minute.
I think the Justices would answer unanimously that now, as
traditionally, they rely heavily on oral presentations. Most of
them form at least a tentative conclusion from it in a large
percentage of the cases. This is not to say that decisions are
wholly at the peril of first impressions. Indeed, deliberation
never ceases and there is no final commitment until decision
actually is announced. It is a common experience that a Justice
is assigned to write an opinion for the Court in accordance with
a view he expressed in conference, only to find from more
intensive study that it was mistaken. In such circumstances, an
inadequate argument would have lost the case, except that the
writing Justice rescues it. Even then, his change of position may
not always be persuasive with his colleagues and loss of a single
vote may be decisive. The bar must make its preparations for
oral argument on the principle that it is always of the highest,
and often of controlling, importance.

PRACTICE (1950), devote a chapter to "Oral Argument," in which perplexed counsel will
find detailed guidance.
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WHO SHOULD PRESENT THE ARGUMENT?

If my experiences at the bar and on the bench unite in
dictating one imperative, it is: Never divide between two or
more counsel the argument on behalf of a single interest.
Sometimes conflicting interests are joined on one side and
division is compelled, but otherwise it should not be risked.
When two lawyers undertake to share a single presentation,
their two arguments at best will be somewhat overlapping,
repetitious and incomplete and, at worst, contradictory,
inconsistent and confusing. I recall one misadventure in division
in which I was to open the case and expound the statute
involved, while counsel for a government agency was to follow
and explain the agency's regulations. This seemed a natural
place to sunder the argument. But the Court perversely refused
to honor the division. So long as I was on my feet, the Justices
were intensely interested in the regulations, which I had not
expected to discuss. By the time my associate took over, they
had developed a lively interest in the statute, which was not his
part of the case. No counsel should be permitted to take the floor
in any case who is not willing to master and able to represent
every aspect of it. If I had my way, the Court rules would permit
only one counsel to argue for a single interest. But while my
colleagues think such a rule would be too drastic, I think they all
agree that an argument almost invariably is less helpful to us for
being parceled out to several counsel.
Selection of leading counsel often receives a consideration
after the case arrives at the high, Court that would have been
more rewarding before the trial. But when the case is docketed
in Supreme Court, the question is, shall counsel who conducted
the case below conduct its final review? If not, who shall be
brought in?
Convincing presentations often are made by little-known
lawyers who have lived with the case through all courts.
However, some lawyers, effective in trial work, are not
temperamentally adapted to less dramatic appellate work. And
sometimes the trial lawyer cannot forego bickering over petty
issues which are no longer relevant to aspects of the case
reviewable by the Supreme Court. When the trial attorney lacks
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dispassionate judgment as to what is important on appeal, a
fresh and detached mind is likely to be more effective.
No lawyer, otherwise fairly equipped for his profession,
need hesitate to argue his own case in Supreme Court merely
because he has not appeared in that Court before. If he will
conform his arguments to the nature of its review and his
preparation to the habits of the Court, he has some advantages
over a lawyer brought in at that late stage. Sometimes even his
handicap will work out to his advantage. Some years ago, a
country lawyer arguing a tax case gleaned from baffling
questions from the bench that his case was not going well. He
closed by saying, "I hope you will agree with me, because if
you don't, I certainly am in wrong with my best client." Such a
plea is not enough to win a decision, but its realism would
assure a most sympathetic hearing from any judge who can still
remember what it is to face and explain to a defeated client.
Many litigants, and not a few lawyers, think it is some
advantage to have their case sponsored by a widely known legal
reputation. If such counsel is selected because of his
professional qualifications, I have nothing to say against that.
Experience before the Supreme Court is valuable, as is
experience in any art. One who is at ease in its presence, familiar
with its practice, and aware of its more recent decisions and
divisions, holds some advantage over the stranger to such
matters. But it is a grave mistake to choose counsel for some
supposed influence or the enchantment of political reputation,
and above all, avoid the lawyer who thinks he is so impressively
eminent that he need give no time to preparation except while he
is on a plane going to Washington. Believe me when I say that
what impresses the Court is a lawyer's argument, not his
eminence.
On your first appearance before the Court, do not waste
your time, or ours, telling us so. We are likely to discover for
ourselves that you are a novice but will think none the less of
you for it. Every famous lawyer had his first day at our bar and
perhaps a sad one. It is not ingratiating to tell us you think it is
an overwhelming honor to appear, for we think of the case as the
important thing before us, not the counsel. Some attorneys use
time to thank us for granting the review, or for listening to their
argument. Those are not intended as favors and it is good taste
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to accept them as routine performance of duty. Be respectful, of
course, but also be self-respectful, and neither disparage yourself
nor flatter the Justices. We think well enough of ourselves
already.
The time may come when you will be sought out to argue a
case for other lawyers. In that event, you should consider
whether it is not due yourself to insist on full responsibility for
its presentation. Divided command is as disastrous to a litigation
as to a military campaign. Either you will be in control of the
litigation or someone else will be in control of your professional
reputation. Some of the wisest leaders of the bar decline to
participate in a case, even with most amiable and reputable
associates, unless they are given undivided command.
The claim recently was given publicity that leading
members of the bar refused professional employment in support
of the Communist challenge to the constitutionality of the Smith
Act. Every accused person has a constitutional right to counsel
and there is a correlative duty on the bar to see that every
accused, no matter how unpopular, is represented competently.
In addition to this sense of duty, many eminent lawyers would
welcome the professional challenge involved in that case.
Knowing this, I examined with care the allegations filed in
Supreme Court that the Communists could not get counsel. They
did not disclose that any so-called leader of the bar had been
asked, or would be allowed, to assume full responsibility for
argument of the case. The most that appeared was that they were
asked to associate themselves with attorneys who were in
control of it and whose conduct of it already had resulted in a
sentence for contempt. No American lawyer is under a duty to
become the tail to another lawyer's kite, or to submit himself to
control of counsel or clients whose tactics in the case he does
not approve. No lawyer becomes too eminent to consult and
cooperate with other members of our brotherhood, but those
who, by a lifetime of hard work and fair dealing, earn enviable
reputations at the bar rightly reject any employment that will
impair that independence of judgment and freedom of action
which becomes an officer of the Court. He is not obliged to
become anyone's mere hired hand.
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WHAT QUESTIONS WILL YOU PRESENT?

One of the first tests of a discriminating advocate is to
select the question, or questions, that he will present orally.
Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate through overissue. The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to
the suggestion that a lower court committed an error. But
receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors
increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one. Of
course, I have not forgotten the reluctance with which a lawyer
abandons even the weakest point lest it prove alluring to the
same kind of judge. But experience on the bench convinces me
that multiplying assignments of error will dilute and weaken a
good case and will not save a bad one.
If you are called in after assignments of error have been
filed, or feel impelled to raise many in your brief, at least forego
oral argument of all but one or two. The impact of oral
presentation will be strengthened if it is concentrated on a few
points that can be simply and convincingly stated and easily
grasped and retained.
The successful advocate will recognize that there is some
weakness in his case and will squarely and candidly meet it. If
he lost in the court below and needs appellate relief, that fact
alone strongly suggests some defect in his position. If he is
responding to a writ of certiorari, he should realize that several
Justices have been tentatively impressed that the judgment
below is dubious or in conflict with that of other courts,
otherwise certiorari would not have been granted. The petitioner
should never dodge or delay but give priority to answering the
reasons why he lost below. The respondent should ask himself
what doubts probably brought the case up and answer them.
They will then be covering the questions that the Justices are
waiting to hear answered. To delay meeting these issues is
improvident; to attempt evasion of them is fatal.
IN WHAT ORDER SHOULD THE ARGUMENT BE ARRANGED?

The order and progression of an argument are important to
its ready comprehension, but in the Supreme Court these are not
wholly within the lawyer's control. It is difficult to please nine
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different minds, and it is a common experience that questions
upset the plan of argument before the lawyer has fairly started. I
used to say that, as Solicitor General, I made three arguments of
every case. First came the one that I planned-as I thought,
logical, coherent, complete. Second was the one actually
presented-interrupted, incoherent, disjointed, disappointing.
The third was the utterly devastating argument that I thought of
after going to bed that night.
I can offer no formula that will guarantee unbroken
argument, for the Supreme Court is much given to interrogation.
Perhaps the opening argument will have the best chance for an
uninterrupted interlude if counsel will begin with a concise
history of the case, state the holding of the court below and
wherein it is challenged. He should follow with a careful
statement of important facts, and conclude with discussion of the
law. Argument of a respondent is more variable. Sometimes it
may be necessary to restate the case and establish justification
for the decision below. At other times it may be more effective
to strike a few selected weak spots in appellant's attack upon the
judgment.
For whichever side he appears, the choice of his materials
and arrangement of its sequence will test the skill of the most
experienced craftsman. The purpose of a hearing is that the
Court may learn what it does not know, and it know least about
the facts. It may sound paradoxical, but most contentions of law
are won or lost on the facts. The facts often incline a judge to
one side or the other. A large part of the time of conference is
given to discussion of facts, to determine under what rule of law
they fall. Dissents are not usually rooted in disagreement as to a
rule of law but as to whether the facts warrant its application.
Sometimes facts are best unfolded chronologically, and at other
times it will be more effective to assemble them about particular
topics. The presentation is sometimes aided by maps and charts,
which counsel is at liberty to use. Courage to drop irrelevant or
unimportant details and to avoid becoming entangled in
interesting or hotly contested questions which do not go to the
result is an aid to clarity.
Counsel must remember that the function of the Supreme
Court is to decide only questions of law. If the appellant, or
petitioner, attempts, or so puts his facts that he appears to be
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attempting, to reargue a verdict or findings of fact, he will meet
with an embarrassing judicial impatience. Both sides should
strive so to present the questions of law that it will be clear they
are not depending upon a reweighing of conflicting evidence.
Oral argument may be simplified by integration with the
brief. Some issues are technical and must be resolved by study
of exact language in statutes, patent claims, or the like. Such
precision is more readily communicated if the eye of the judge is
called to aid of his ear. Some counsel meet this problem by
making a brief general statement of their ultimate contention and
requesting the Court to consult the brief for the close analysis in
its support. Others fully expound their contention orally, reading
the decisive language, requesting the Justices to follow it for
themselves, and pointing out the page in the record or briefs
where it is to be found.
In discussing questions of law, the advocate must
sometimes hazard a guess as to how much of the law applicable
to his case the judges already know. He is too polite-and
discreet-to enter upon a long legal exposition that will
insinuate a lack of judicial acquaintance with elementary
propositions. On the other hand, it is his duty not to risk
omission of the many matters that judges are presumed to know
but often do not.
It does not seem to me safe ever to assume that a judge is
able to recall exact words of a statute or document, even if he is
known to be familiar with its general terms. Statutory language
is artificial, elusive and difficult to carry in mind. Dates,
relationships of persons named, and other details escape
memory.
But I should make the contrary assumption about the
Court's own precedents, particularly its recent precedents. I can
think of no more dismal and fruitless use of time than to recite
case after case, with explanations why each is, or is not,
applicable. If the authority for your contention is a decision, of
course you must make clear its meaning and application. But if
the one or two best precedents will not convince, a score of
weaker ones will only reveal the weakness of your argument. I
always look with suspicion upon a proposition with a page full
of citations in its support. And if the first decision cited does not
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support it, I conclude the lawyer has a blunderbuss mind and
rely on him no further.
It would surprise you to know how frequently counsel
undertake to expound a recent decision to the very men who
made it. If the exposition is accurate, it adds nothing to the
Court's knowledge and if it is not, it discredits counsel's
perception or fairness. My advice is to presume judicial
familiarity with recent decisions, accept them at full face value
and read nothing more into them, and thereby avoid
entanglement in any disagreements that may have occurred
within the Court when they were written.
Now and then a lawyer invokes or quotes a dissent in aid of
his cause. By identifying his contention with a recent dissent, he
may close some minds to the rest of his argument. Of course,
majority decisions are sometimes overruled and dissents become
the law, but usually after considerable time has elapsed. If the
overruling of a decision is all that will save you, go about asking
it directly and candidly. But if your case can be supported by
Court decisions, it will not be wise to confound it with even a
good quotation from a dissent. Sometimes counsel is confronted
with the dilemma of inconsistent lines of authority where the
Court has recently overruled its own not-very-old decision. In
such cases, the sitting Justices are apt to be sharply divided as to
which rule will apply to slightly varied facts. I have no advice to
offer in this situation-you will just have to get out of that
dilemma by your own wit.
Whether one will invoke extrajudicial writings or speeches
of a sitting judge is a matter of taste-usually, I may say, of bad
taste. I do not recall any instance in which it helped. A collegiate
court entertains as many different views as it has colleagues.
Individual expressions, such, for instance, as this lecture, may or
may not accord with the views of other Justices, and reliance
upon controversial writings of one Justice may alienate others.
But if an individual judge is to be quoted, by all means let it be
in matter-of-fact fashion and without tossing compliments to the
writer, for nothing depreciates one's position more certainly and
quickly than to fawn upon one of the judges whom he appears to
think he can capture by flattery, and nothing is less welcome to
the judge.
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Regard for his professional standing will deter the lawyer
from intentional misleading, but it is twice prudent not to quote
out of context or ascribe a strained meaning to writings of a
sitting judge. I have been, and I have seen other Justices,
indignant at the distortion of some writing. It is hard to retrieve
the confidence forfeited by seeking such an advantage.
The rules permit opening counsel, after making a fair
opening, to reserve time for rebuttal. I would not say that
rebuttal is never to be indulged. At times it supplies important
and definite corrections. But the most experienced advocates
make least use of the privilege. Many inexperienced ones get
into trouble by attempting to renew the principal argument. One
who returns to his feet exposes himself to an accumulation of
questions. Cases have been lost that, before counsel undertook a
long rebuttal, appeared to be won.
WHAT AIDS TO DELIVERY OF THE ARGUMENT ARE
APPROPRIATE?

The manner of delivery must express the talents and habits
of the advocate. No one method is indispensable to success, and
practice varies widely. Few lawyers are gifted with memory and
composure to argue a case without papers of any kind before
them. It is not necessary to try. The memorized oration, or
anything stilted and inflexible, is not appropriate. Equally
objectionable is the opposite extreme-an unorganized,
rambling discourse, relying on the inspiration of the moment. If
one's oral argument is simply reading his printed brief aloud, he
could as well stay at home. Almost as unsatisfying is any
argument that has been written out and is read off to us, page
after page. We like to meet the eye of the advocate, and
sometimes when one starts reading his argument from a
manuscript he will be interrupted, to wean him from his essay;
but it does not often succeed. If you have confidence to address
the Court only by reading to it, you really should not argue
there.
The first step in preparation for all exigencies of argument
is to become filled with your case-to know every detail of the
evidence and findings, to weigh fairly every contention of your
adversary, and to review not only the rule of law applicable to
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the specific issue but the body of law in its general field. You
never know when some collateral or tangential issue will
suddenly come up.
My practice was to prepare notes, consisting of headings
and catch-words rather than of details, to guide the order of
argument and prevent important items from being overlooked.
Such notes help to get back on the track if one is thrown off by
interruptions. They will tend to limit rambling and irrelevance,
give you some measure of confidence, and at the same time let
you frequently meet your judges eye to eye.
Do not think it beneath you to rehearse for an argument.
Not even Caruso, at the height of his artistic career, felt above
rehearsing for a hundredth performance, although he and the
whole cast were guided and confined by a libretto and a score.
Of course, I do not suggest that you should declaim and gesture
before a mirror. But, if you have an associate, try out different
approaches and thrash out every point with him. Answer the
questions that occur to another mind. See what sequence of facts
is most effective. Accustom yourself to your materials in
different arrangements. Argue the case to yourself, your client,
your secretary, your friend, and your wife is she is patient. Use
very available anvil on which to hammer out your argument.
If one is not familiar with the Court and its ways, it may be
helpful to arrive a day or two early to observe its procedure, to
see how the Court deals with counsel and how counsel gets on
with the Court.
When the day arrives, shut out every influence that might
distract your mind. An interview with an emotional client in
difficulty may be upsetting. Friends who bear bad news may
unintentionally disturb your poise. Hear nothing but your case,
see nothing but your case, talk nothing but your case. If making
an argument is not a great day in your life, don't make it; and if
it is, give it everything in you.
By all means leave at home the associate who feels
constantly impelled to tug at your coattails, to push briefs in
front of you, or to pass up unasked-for suggestions while you are
speaking. These well-meant but ill-conceived offerings distract
the attention of the Court, but they are even more embarrassing
and confusing to counsel. The offender is an unmitigated pest,
and even if he is the attorney who employed you, suppress him.
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I doubt whether it is wise to have clients or parties in
interest attend the argument if it can be avoided. Clients
unfortunately desire, and their presence is apt to encourage,
qualities in an argument that are least admired by judges. When
I hear counsel launch into personal attacks on the opposition or
praise of a client, I instinctively look about to see if I can
identify the client in the room-and often succeed. Some
counsel have become conspicuous for the gallery that listens to
their argument and, when it is finished, ostentatiously departs.
The case that is argued to please a client, impress a following in
the audience, or attract notice from the press, will not often
make a favorable impression on the bench. An argument is not a
spectacle.
You should be warned that, in acoustical qualities, the
Supreme Court chamber is wretched. If your voice is low, it
burdens the hearing, and parts of what you say may be missed.
On the other hand, no judge likes to be shouted at as if he were
an ox. I know of nothing you can do except to bear the difficulty
in mind, watch the bench, and adapt your delivery to avoid
causing apparent strain.
The time allotted to you will be one hour ordinarily, and
half of that if the case is on summary docket. Time is
sometimes, though rarely, extended in advance if the case
appears to require it, but seldom do we find extended time of
much help to the Court. In any event, do not waste time
complaining that you do not have enough time. That is a
confession of your own inadequacy to handle the case as the
Court's experience indicates it should be. Keep account of your
own time, or, if you cannot, have an assistant do so. Some
lawyers ask, and some even ask several times, how much time
they have left and wait for it to be calculated. Why will a lawyer
interrupt his effort to hold the attention of a Court to his
argument in order to divert its mind to the clock? Successful
advocacy will keep the Justices' minds on the case, and off the
clock.
This, above all, remember: Time has been bestowed upon
you, not imposed upon you. It will show confidence in yourself
and in your case, and good management of your argument, if
you finish before the signal stops you. On the other hand, if the
warning that your time has expired catches you in the middle of
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an argument, the chances are that you have not made good

economy of your time.
To BE, OR NOT TO BE, QUESTIONED FROM THE BENCH?

The Supreme Court, more than most tribunals, is given to
questioning counsel. Since all of the Justices gave the case
preliminary consideration when certiorari was granted or
jurisdiction was noted, tentative opinions or inquiries are apt to
linger in their minds.
Questions usually seek to elicit information or to aid in
advancing or clarifying the argument. A question argumentative
in form should not be attributed to hostility, for oftentimes it is
put, not to overbear counsel, but to help him sharpen his
position. Now and then, of course, counsel may be caught in a
cross-fire of questions between differing Justices, each
endeavoring to bring out some point favorable to his own view
of the law. That tests the agility and diplomacy of counsel.
Some lawyers feel an ill-concealed resentment at questions
from the bench. It is not hard to see that if they had the wit they
would have the will to respond as did a British barrister in an
incident related to me by Arthur Goodhart, K.E.B., K.C.: The
Judge said: "I have been listening to you now for four hours and
I am bound to say I am none the wiser." The barrister replied:
"Oh, I know that, my Lord, but I had hoped you would be better
informed."
A Justice may abruptly indicate conclusions which tempt a
lawyer to reply as one did long ago in a local court in the county
where I practiced. He had barely stated his contention when the
judge said: "There is nothing to your proposition-just nothing
to it." The lawyer drew himself up and said: "Your Honor, I
have worked on this case for six weeks and you have not heard
of it twenty minutes. Now, Judge, you are a lot smarter man than
I am, but there is not that much difference between us."
But I always feel that there should be some comfort derived
from any question from the bench. It is clear proof that the
inquiring Justice is not asleep. If the question is relevant, it
denotes he is grappling with your contention, even though he
had not grasped it. It gives you opportunity to inflate his ego by
letting him think he has discovered an idea for himself.
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When I was at the bar, it seemed to me that I could make
no better use of my time than to answer any doubt which a judge
would do me the favor to disclose. Experience in the Court
teaches that a lawyer's best points are sometimes made by
answers to pertinent and penetrating questions. A lively dialogue
may be a swifter and surer vehicle to truth than a dismal
monologue. The wise advocate will eagerly embrace the
opportunity to put at rest any misconception or doubt which, if
the judge waited to raise it in the conference room, counsel
would have no chance and perhaps no one present would have
the information to answer.
Some lawyers complain that questioning is overdone; and
sometimes colloquy between Court and counsel is undoubtedly
carried too far. If cases were uniformly well presented, perhaps
the best results would be obtained if few questions were asked.
Generally, an argument that from its very outset shows that it
will be well-organized and thorough tends to ward off questions.
At all events, nothing tests the skill of an advocate or endangers
his position more than his answer to questions, and in nothing is
experience, poise, and a disciplined mind a greater asset.
I advise you never to postpone answer to a question, for
that always gives an impression of evasion. It is better
immediately to answer the question, even though you do so in
short form and suggest that you expect to amplify and support
your answer later.
Counsel should be prepared to deal with any relevant
question, but, if he is not, he ventures less by a frank admission
that he does not know the answer than by a guess. Counsel need
not fear that he will be prejudiced by declining to be drawn into
a discussion of some proposition that is irrelevant to his case. To
refuse might seem like a rebuff to the inquirer, but it might
delight eight colleagues.
How SHOULD

COUNSEL BE ATTIRED?

It may seem a trivial matter, but I am told that one of the
questions most frequently addressed to the Clerk's Office
concerns the apparel in which counsel must, or should, appear.
Formal dress is traditional and I understand once was required.
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Some amusing stories of those days linger among Court

attaches. It is said that Chief Justice Taft once refused admission
to the bar to a candidate who appeared without necktie or
waistcoat, with the suggestion that he renew his application
when properly attired. The Marshal's Office kept in active
service, and still keeps in moth balls, one or two cutaway coats
to lend to counsel in need. Apparently he was expected to be
equipped with his own trousers.
Those days have passed away, but the tradition remains that
appearance before the Court is no ordinary occasion.
Government lawyers and many others, particularly older ones,
adhere to the custom of formal morning dress. The clerk's
Office advises that either this or a dark business suit is
appropriate. But the informality which permeates all official life
has penetrated the Court. It lays down no rule for its bar.
No toleration, however, can repeal the teaching of Polonius
that "The apparel oft proclaims the man." You will not be
stopped from arguing if you wear a race-track suit or sport a
rainbow necktie. You will just create a first impression that you
have strayed in at the wrong bar. For raiment of counsel, like the
robe of the judge, is taken as somewhat symbolic of his
function. In Europe the advocate, as well as the judge, is
expected to robe for his appearance in court. The lawyer of good
taste will not worry about his dress, because instinctively it will
be that which is suitable to his station in life-a member of a
dignified and responsible profession-and for an important and
somewhat formal occasion.
WHAT REMEDIES HAS THE DISAPPOINTED LAWYER?

In most courts the folklore of the profession gives the

aggrieved lawyer a choice of remedies: One is to appeal, the
other is to go down to the tavern and cuss out the court. He may,
and usually does, pursue both simultaneously. But the tavern
cussing of the Supreme Court has to be stronger than usual, to

compensate for the lack of any appeal. In Washington it will be
easy for a disappointed lawyer to find sympathetic companions.
We are never surprised nor angered when disappointed counsel
avails himself of the one relief left to him. Sometimes one or
more dissenting Justices would like to join him.
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I think it was Mr. Justice Brandeis who said that a judge
often must decide a case as if he were 100% convinced one way
or the other, although usually he is not more than 55%
convinced. Many decisions prevail by a narrow margin of
Justices, and the decisive Justices admit a large margin of doubt.
More than a few Court opinions represent a compromise of
reasoning, if not of result. While I recognize the annoyance to
the bar of dissenting and concurring opinions, I think they are
the lesser of evils. A Court opinion which puts out a misleading
impression of unanimity by avoiding, or confusing, an
underlying difference is a false beacon to the profession. Far
better that the division be forthrightly exposed so that the
profession will know on what narrow grounds the case rests and
can form some estimate of how changed facts may affect the
alignment in a subsequent case.
If you are inclined to think the Court has given too little
time to your case, or too superficial consideration to your
contention, it may be some comfort to know that in most cases I,
for one, would agree with you. Few decisions are handed down
that. I do not wish it were possible for me to give more time and
study. From the viewpoint of the bench, yours is but one of a
dozen cases to be argued in the same week; it is but one of over
two hundred cases to be decided on the merits during the term
and is but one of a thousand or twelve hundred cases in which
we have to pass on petitions for relief during the year. The
printed pages filed in these cases are several times those which
any judge, if he could give twenty-four hours a day to the task,
would be able to read.
Some of the most thoroughly prepared men, by learning
and practice, that have come upon the Supreme Court bench
have found it necessary to "scorn delights and live laborious
days" to satisfy their own sense of duty. Justices Brandeis and
Cardozo were almost as retired as hermits and Chief Justice
Hughes withdrew from all social engagement, except one night a
week which he allowed Mrs. Hughes to bestow on their friends.
Judges practicing self-denial under such pressure may well be
impatient of surplusage, irrelevance, and professional
incompetence.
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Is ADVOCACY A LOST ART?
Certainly not. So long as controversies between men have
to be settled by judges, proficiency in the art of forensic
persuasion will assure one of first rank in our high calling. In the
judicial process, as practiced among English-speaking peoples,
the judge and the advocate complement each other, for, as
Thoreau said, "It takes two to speak the truth-one to speak and
another to hear."
But if not a lost art, advocacy is an exacting one. When he
rises to speak at the bar, the advocate stands intellectually naked
and alone. Habits of thought and speech cannot be borrowed like
garments for the event. What an advocate gives to a case is
himself; he can bring to the bar only what is within him. A part
written for him will never be convincing.
If you aspire to such a task, and I address particularly the
younger men at the bar and in the schools, do not let your
preparation wait upon a retainer. There is not time to become an
advocate after the important case comes to you. Webster, when
asked as to the time spent in preparing one of his memorable
arguments, is said to have replied that his whole life was given
to its preparation. So it is with every notable forensic effort.
The most persuasive quality in the advocate is professional
sincerity. By that I do not mean that he believes in his case as
the Mohammedan does in his Koran. But he must believe that
under our adversary system both sides of every controversy
should be worthily presented with vigor--even with partisan
zeal-so that all material for judgment will be before the Court
and its judgment will suffer no distortion. He must believe with
all the intensity of his being in law as the framework of society,
in the independent judicial function as the means for applying
the law, and in the nobility of his profession as an aid in the
judicial process. He will feel equal disdain for a judge partisan
in his favor and one partisan in his opposition. The opportunist,
the lawyer for revenue only, the cynic, will never reach the
higher goal.
The effective advocate will not let mastery of a specialty
foreclose that catholicity of interest essential to the rounded life
and the balanced judgment. He will draw inspiration not alone
from the literature of the law, but from the classics, history, the
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essay, the drama, and poetry as well. It is one of the delights and
intellectual rewards of the legal profession that it lays under
tribute every science and every art. The advocate will read and
reread the majestic efforts of leaders of his profession on
important occasions, and linger over their manner of handling
challenging subjects. He will stock the arsenal of his mind with
tested dialectical weapons. He will master the short Saxon word
that pierces the mind like a spear and the simple figure that
lights the understanding. He will never drive the judge to his
dictionary. He will rejoice in the strength of the mother tongue
as found in the King James version of the Bible, and in the
power of the terse and flashing phrase of a Kipling or a
Churchill. And the advocate will have courage, courage to assert
his conviction that the world is round, though all about him men
of authority say it is flat. Most memorable professional
achievements were in the face of opposition, abuse, even
ridicule.
The advocate may be summoned often to other forums, but
he will appear in the Supreme Court of the United States only
when that tribunal has been satisfied that decision of his cause is
important to the body of federal law. Emphasis on the public
interest in a just and uniform legal system has submerged
emphasis on special equities and individual interests which
properly prevail in trial and intermediate courts.
Adequately and helpfully to present a case-as it is about
to be transformed into a precedent to guide future courts, to
settle the fate of unknown litigants, perhaps to become required
reading for a rising generation of lawyers-will challenge and
inspire the true advocate. Decisional law is a distinctive feature
of our common-law system, a system which can exist only
where men are free, lawyers are courageous and judges are
independent. To participate as advocate in supplying the basis
for decisional law-making calls for vision of a prophet, as well
as a profound appreciation of the continuity between the law of
today and that of the past. He will be sharing the task of
reworking decisional law by which every generation seeks to
preserve its essential character and at the same time to adapt it to
contemporary needs. At such a moment the lawyer's case ceases
to be an episode in the affairs of a client and becomes a stone in
the edifice of the law.
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As I view the procession of lawyers who pass before the

Supreme Court, I often am reminded of an old parable. Once
upon a time three stone masons were asked, one after the other,
what they were doing. The first, without looking up, answered,
"Earning my living." The second replied, "I am shaping this
stone to pattern." The third lifted his eyes and said, "I am
building a Cathedral." So it is with the men of the law at labor
before the Court. The attitude and preparation of some show that
they have no conception of their effort higher than to make a
living. Others are dutiful but uninspired in trying to shape their
little cases to a winning pattern. But it lifts up the heart of a
judge when an advocate stands at the bar who knows that he is
building a Cathedral.

